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OPINION 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 At issue in these consolidated appeals is the standing 
of third-party payors of drugs prescribed for ―off-label‖ 
purposes, i.e., uses not approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration (―FDA‖), as well as the standing of individual 
patients prescribed drugs for off-label purposes, to pursue 
claims against a pharmaceutical company and its affiliated 
marketing entities under the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (―RICO‖), 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et 
seq., the New Jersey RICO statute, N.J.S.A §2C:41-1, et seq., 
as well as other state statutory and common law causes of 
action.  Both groups of plaintiffs claim that the defendants 
pursued illegal marketing campaigns to persuade physicians 
to prescribe certain drugs for off-label uses.  The District 
Court found that both groups of plaintiffs lacked standing 
because, inter alia, they did not allege a plausible nexus 
between the assailed marketing campaign and the physicians‘ 
decisions to prescribe certain drugs for off-label use.  Having 
carefully considered the parties‘ contentions in the context of 
the entire record, we agree that dismissal of both actions for 
want of standing is warranted.  Accordingly, we will affirm 
the District Court‘s well-reasoned decisions. 
I. 
 A.  The Parties 
 There are two sets of plaintiffs in these consolidated 
appeals.  One set of Plaintiffs consists of a putative 
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nationwide class of third-party payors (―TPPs‖).1   The other 
set of Plaintiffs is comprised of a putative nationwide class of 
individual patient-consumers who paid for prescriptions of 
certain drugs for off-label uses, with the named class 
representative being Angela F. Montgomery.
2
   Separate 
Amended Complaints were filed on behalf of each set of 
Plaintiffs.  The Defendants common to both Amended 
Complaints are the Schering-Plough Corporation, a 
manufacturer of pharmaceutical products, and its affiliated 
marketing and sales companies, the Schering Sales 
Corporation and Schering Corporation.  The TPP Amended 
Complaint also names as defendants another Schering 
subsidiary,  Integrated Therapeutics Group, Inc., individual 
Schering executives Richard J. Kogan, William K. Heiden, 
and Mary Naughton, as well as unnamed individuals (―John 
Doe‖ and ―Jane Doe‖ defendants), and unknown business 
entities (―ABC Corporations‖), who purportedly participated 
in the alleged illegal and false sales and marketing 
campaigns.  For sake of simplicity, we shall refer to the 
                                              
1
 There are four TPPs named as plaintiffs:  the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 331 Health 
& Welfare Fund (―Local 331‖), Heavy and General Laborers‘ 
Local Union 472/172 Welfare Fund, United American 
Insurance Company, and Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama.  
Local 331 is the only third-party payor to appeal.  We are thus 
concerned only with the standing of Local 331. 
 
2
 This action originally included five named patients:  
Angela F. Montgomery, Harold Estelle, Beryl A‘Dare 
Bratton, Dorothy Bratton, and John Huston.  Only Angela F. 
Montgomery has continued to pursue this matter.  We are 
thus concerned only with Montgomery‘s standing. 
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Defendants collectively as ―Schering.‖  Both sets of Plaintiffs 
assert that they paid for Schering drugs that were ineffective 
or unsafe for the off-label uses for which they were 
prescribed.   
 B.  FDCA Labeling and Marketing Regulations 
 The off-label marketing claims are at least partially 
predicated on Schering‘s alleged violations of the labeling 
and marketing restrictions of the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (―FDCA‖).  The FDCA 
regulates the manufacturing, marketing and sale of 
prescription drugs, and provides that a drug cannot be sold in 
interstate commerce unless it is approved by the FDA for the 
specific medical use, or ―indication,‖ listed on the drug‘s 
labeling.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (―No person shall introduce 
or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any new 
drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant to 
subsection (b) or (j) of this section is effective with respect to 
such drug.‖).  To obtain FDA approval, drug companies 
generally must submit evidence from clinical trials and other 
testing that evaluate the drug‘s risks and benefits and 
demonstrate that it is safe and effective for all of the 
indications ―prescribed, recommended, or suggested‖ on the 
drug‘s label.  See id. at § 355(d). 
 Prescription drugs frequently have therapeutic uses 
other than their FDA-approved indications.  The FDCA, 
however, generally prohibits manufacturers from marketing, 
advertising, or otherwise promoting drugs for such 
unapproved or ―off-label‖ uses.  See 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) and 
(d) (prohibiting manufacturers from introducing a drug into 
interstate commerce with an intent that it be used for an off-
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label purchase, or by ―misbranding‖ it by including 
information about unapproved uses on its label). 
 Because the FDCA does not regulate the practice of 
medicine, physicians may lawfully prescribe drugs for off-
label uses.  See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 
U.S. 341, 350 (2001) (recognizing off-label usage as ―an 
accepted and necessary corollary of the FDA‘s mission to 
regulate in this area without directly interfering with the 
practice of medicine.‖); Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 
F.3d 331, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (―A physician may prescribe a 
legal drug to serve any purpose that he or she deems 
appropriate, regardless of whether the drug has been approved 
for that use by the FDA.‖). Thus, there is a certain 
―asymmetry‖ in the regulation of off-label uses: while 
physicians may lawfully prescribe drugs for off-label uses, 
the FDCA generally prohibits manufacturers from marketing 
these uses to physicians.  See id. at 332-33 (referring to the 
FDCA‘s ―asymmetrical—if not necessarily inconsistent—
regulatory treatment‖ of off-label uses).  Indeed, the FDCA‘s 
regulatory regime prohibits manufacturers from directly 
advertising off-label uses, such as through labeling claims or 
explicit statements made by sales representatives.  Moreover, 
it is also unlawful for manufacturers to engage in certain 
indirect methods of off-label marketing.  For example, in 
certain circumstances it is unlawful for manufacturers to 
sponsor continuing medical education (―CME‖) courses that 
focus on off-label uses.  The FDCA does, however, permit 
manufacturers to distribute information about off-label uses in 
certain limited circumstances.  See id. at 333. 
 The drugs involved in these consolidated appeals (the 
―Subject Drugs‖) are certain oncology and Hepatitis drugs, 
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including Intron®-A (―Intron-A‖), PEG-Intron® (―PEG-
Intron‖), Rebetol® (―Rebetol‖) and Rebetron® (―Rebetron‖) 
(collectively the ―Intron Franchise Drugs‖), and Temodar® 
(―Temodar‖).  The FDA has approved these drugs for specific 
purposes.   
 C.  Criminal Case Against Schering 
 In June 2001, the FDA‘s Division of Drug Marketing, 
Advertising, and Communications sent Schering Sales a letter 
notifying it that the FDA had ―identified various promotional 
activities that [were] in violation of the [FDCA] and its 
implementing regulations.‖  (Information at 12-16, United 
States v. Schering Sales Corp., No. 06-CR-10250 (D. Mass. 
Aug. 29, 2006)).  The letter cited a May 2001 American 
Society of Clinical Oncology Annual Meeting in San 
Francisco at which the FDA witnessed Schering sales 
representatives give purportedly ―false or misleading efficacy 
information about Temodar to visitors at the commercial 
exhibit hall booth,‖ and ―promote[] Temodar for the 
unapproved use in first line therapy of anaplastic 
astrocytoma.‖  (Id. at 12-13).  The FDA‘s letter requested that 
Schering ―immediately cease making such violative 
statements and any other promotional activities or materials 
for Temodar that make the same or similar claims or 
presentations.‖  (Id. at 13).   
 In August 2006, the United States Attorney for the 
District of Massachusetts charged Schering Sales with 
conspiracy to make false statements to the federal 
government, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.  (Id. at 12-16).  
The Government‘s one-count Information alleged that 
―Schering Sales and its co-conspirators knowingly and 
willfully made material false statements to the FDA.‖  (Id. at 
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8).   It stated that Schering Sales‘ response to the FDA June 
2001 letter specifically asserted that Schering‘s home office 
had ―aggressively pursued sales of Intron A and Temodar for 
unapproved uses‖ through numerous methods, including 
training the sales force to seek off-label sales, requiring the 
sales force to ―create business plans that emphasized detailed 
promotional goals to obtain off-label sales,‖ and 
compensating the sales force partly on their success in 
achieving off-label sales.  (Id.) 
 Schering Sales pleaded guilty to the one-count 
Information pursuant to a written Settlement Agreement.  
(See Amended Judgment, United States v. Schering Sales 
Corp., 06-CR-10250 (D. Mass. Feb 7, 2007)).  Under the 
Settlement Agreement, Schering Sales agreed to pay fine of 
$180 million.  (Id.)  It also agreed to pay $255 million to 
resolve civil claims that it defrauded U.S. Government health 
benefit programs, including Medicare, Medicaid, and the 
Veteran‘s Administration.  (Id.) 
 D.  Consolidated Putative Class Action 
 Following Schering‘s settlement with the Government, 
various civil suits were filed across the country by consumer 
plaintiffs who were prescribed, consumed, and paid for the 
drugs, and by TPPs who paid for the Subject Drugs 
prescribed to their plan members.  The Judicial Panel on 
Multi-District Litigation ordered the cases to be transferred to 
the District of New Jersey, where Schering is incorporated, 
and consolidated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. 
 The District Court directed that the various actions 
transferred to it be consolidated for pretrial management and 
that a consolidated complaint on behalf of all plaintiffs be 
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filed.  In December 2007, the nine named plaintiffs (the four 
TPPs and five patients identified in footnotes 1 and 2, supra) 
filed a Consolidated Class Action Complaint (the 
―Complaint‖) on behalf of themselves and others similarly 
situated, alleging that the Defendants engaged in illegal 
promotion of the Subject Drugs in violation of the federal and 
New Jersey RICO statutes (Counts I and II), and the New 
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (―NJCFA‖), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
56:8-1, et seq. (Count III).  The Complaint also asserted 
common law claims for unjust enrichment (Count IV); civil 
conspiracy (Count V); fraud (Count VI); negligent 
misrepresentation (Count VII); aiding and abetting breach of 
fiduciary duty (Count VIII); and equitable accounting (Count 
IX).   
 In an Order and Opinion issued on July 10, 2009, the 
District Court dismissed the Complaint in its entirety pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), for failure to 
state a claim and lack of standing, but granted leave to file an 
amended complaint.  In re Schering-Plough Corp. 
Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, Slip Copy, 2009 WL 
2043604 (D.N.J. 2009) (―Schering I‖).  The Court found that 
the Complaint lacked sufficient factual allegations to 
plausibly assert an injury-in-fact that was cognizable under 
any of the asserted causes of action and fairly traceable to the 
Defendants‘ alleged misconduct.   
 In September 2009, two separate Amended Complaints 
were filed, one by Montgomery and the other by the four TPP 
plaintiffs identified in footnote 1, supra.  Montgomery filed 
an Amended Civil Consumer Class Action Complaint 
(―MAC‖) individually and on behalf of a putative nationwide 
class of similarly situated patient-consumers who purchased, 
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were reimbursed, and/or paid for any of the Subject Drugs 
during the class period.   The MAC asserted violations of the 
Washington State Consumer Protection Act, Wash. Rev. 
Code § 19.86.010, et seq. (Count I), and the consumer 
protection statutes of the remaining 49 states, the District of 
Columbia, and Puerto Rico (Count II), as well as claims of 
civil conspiracy (Count III), aiding and abetting breach of 
fiduciary duty (Count IV), and unjust enrichment (Count V).   
 The TPP plaintiffs filed an Amended Consolidated 
Class Action Complaint (―TPP Complaint‖) on behalf of a 
proposed class of health and welfare funds and other TPPs 
who paid any portion of the purchase price for the Subject 
Drugs during the class period.  The TPP Complaint asserted 
violations of the federal and New Jersey RICO statutes, 
(Counts I and  II), in addition to common law claims for 
intentional interference with contractual relations (Count III) 
and unjust enrichment (Count IV). 
 The Plaintiffs‘ Amended Complaints allege that 
Schering engaged in a widespread marketing campaign that 
employed illegal techniques to promote prescriptions of the 
Subject Drugs for off-label uses.  They contend that these 
illegal practices included: (1) promoting certain of the Subject 
Drugs for off-label uses; (2) using false and misleading 
statements to promote certain of the Subject Drugs as 
effective, safe, and cost-effective for off-label uses; and (3) 
providing physicians with disguised and undisguised bribes, 
kickbacks and other illegal inducements to encourage them to 
prescribe the Subject Drugs for off-label uses. 
 Plaintiffs claim that Schering used a variety of 
methods to effectuate this marketing scheme and disseminate 
its false claims.  For example, they allege that Schering 
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trained its sales representatives to mislead medical 
professionals about the Subject Drugs‘ effectiveness for off-
label uses by distorting contrary scientific data and the results 
of clinical studies.  They also claim that the Schering sales 
force promoted off-label prescriptions by disseminating false 
and misleading statements in private sales meetings with 
doctors, at medical conferences, and in CME programs.  
Plaintiffs also assert that Schering promoted these off-label 
prescriptions through both disguised and undisguised bribes 
to induce doctors to prescribe the Subject Drugs. 
 Plaintiffs aver that Schering‘s unlawful marketing 
practices caused physicians to prescribe the Subject Drugs for 
off-label uses instead of equally effective alternative 
treatments that were approved for the prescribed uses or no 
medication at all.  They assert that these marketing techniques 
led to a significant increase in prescriptions of the Subject 
Drugs for off-label uses, and contend that this caused the 
Plaintiffs ―ascertainable loss‖ because they paid ―hundreds of 
millions, if not billions, of dollars for the Subject Drugs that 
they otherwise would not have paid.‖   
 On October 28, 2009, Schering filed separate motions 
to dismiss each Amended Complaint.  On June 9, 2010, the 
District Court issued separate Orders and Opinions 
(collectively, ―Schering II‖) granting both motions.  The 
Court dismissed the TPP Complaint because it failed to 
adequately plead the injury-in-fact and causation elements 
required to establish standing to assert its RICO, interference 
with contractual relations, and unjust enrichment claims.  The 
Court also held that even if the Complaint had established 
standing to pursue non-RICO claims, its two common law 
claims of interference with contractual relations and unjust 
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enrichment would still fail under Rule 12(b)(6).  The Court 
dismissed the MAC for failure to show a causal link between 
Montgomery‘s alleged injury and Schering‘s alleged 
misconduct.   
II.   
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court‘s dismissal of the Amended Complaints.  See United 
States ex rel. Atkinson v. Pa. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 
514 (3d Cir. 2007) (review of dismissal for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is plenary); Howard 
Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 
246 (3d Cir. 2010) (review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is 
plenary). 
 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), a court must grant a 
motion to dismiss if it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear 
a claim.  ―A motion to dismiss for want of standing is   . . . 
properly brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), because standing 
is a jurisdictional matter.‖  Ballentine v. United States, 486 
F.3d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007).  In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(1) 
motion, a court must first determine whether the movant 
presents a facial or factual attack.  Mortensen v. First Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).  In 
reviewing a facial challenge, which contests the sufficiency of 
the pleadings, ―the court must only consider the allegations of 
the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached 
thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.‖  Gould 
Elec. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
The Defendants‘ Rule 12(b)(1) motions are properly 
understood as facial attacks because they contend that the 
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Amended Complaints lack sufficient factual allegations to 
establish standing. 
 In evaluating whether a complaint adequately pleads 
the elements of standing, courts apply the standard of 
reviewing a complaint pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim: ―Court[s] must accept as 
true all material allegations set forth in the complaint, and 
must construe those facts in favor of the nonmoving party.‖  
Ballentine, 486 F.3d at 810 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 501 (1975)); see also Baldwin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh 
Med. Ctr., 636 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 2011) (―A dismissal for 
lack of statutory standing is effectively the same as a 
dismissal for failure to state a claim.‖).  The Supreme Court 
most recently explained this standard in Bell Atl. Corp v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 
S.Ct. 1937 (2009): ―[A] complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‗state a claim to relief that 
is plausible on its face.‘‖  Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).  We have outlined a three-step 
approach to evaluating whether a complaint satisfies this 
standard: 
First, the court must ―tak[e] note of the 
elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.‖  
Second, the court should identify allegations 
that, ―because they are no more than 
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption 
of truth.‖  Finally, ―where there are well-
pleaded factual allegations, a court should 
assume their veracity and then determine 
whether they plausibly give rise to an 
entitlement for relief.‖ 
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Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947-50) (footnote 
omitted). 
 While the plausibility standard does not impose a 
―probability requirement,‖ it does demand ―more than a sheer 
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.‖  Iqbal, 129 
S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).  Pursuant to 
Iqbal‘s clarification of the plausibility determination as a 
―context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 
draw on its judicial experience and common sense,‖ id., this 
Court has found that ―[s]ome claims require more factual 
explication than others to state a plausible claim for relief.‖  
West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 
98 (3d Cir. 2010).  We have reasoned that, ―[f]or example, it 
generally takes fewer factual allegations to state a claim for 
simple battery than to state a claim for antitrust conspiracy.‖  
Id. 
 ―A complaint has to ‗show‘ such an entitlement with 
its facts.‖  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  With respect to 12(b)(1) motions in particular, 
―[t]he plaintiff must assert facts that affirmatively and 
plausibly suggest that the pleader has the right he claims 
(here, the right to jurisdiction), rather than facts that are 
merely consistent with such a right.‖  Stalley v. Catholic 
Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 2007). 
III. 
 Article III of the Constitution limits the scope of the 
Federal judicial power to the adjudication of ―cases‖ or 
―controversies.‖  U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.  This ―bedrock 
requirement,‖ Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for 
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Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982), 
protects the system of separated powers and respect for the 
coequal branches by restricting the province of the judiciary 
to ―decid[ing] on the rights of individuals.‖  Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).  Indeed, ―‗[n]o 
principle is more fundamental to the judiciary‘s proper role in 
our system of government than the constitutional limitation of 
federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.‘‖  
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (quoting Simon v. 
E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976)). 
 The courts have developed several justicability 
doctrines to enforce the case-or-controversy requirement, and 
―perhaps the most important of these doctrines‖ is the 
requirement that ―a litigant have ‗standing‘ to invoke the 
power of a federal court.‖  Allen v. Wright, 486 U.S. 737, 750 
(1984).  ―[T]he standing question is whether the plaintiff has 
‗alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy‘ as to warrant his invocation of federal-court 
jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial 
powers on his behalf.‖  Warth, 422 U.S. at 498-99 (citing 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). 
 The plaintiff bears the burden of meeting the 
―irreducible constitutional minimum‖ of Article III standing 
by establishing three elements: 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury 
in fact—an invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized 
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct 
complained of—the injury has to be fairly 
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traceable to the challenged action of the 
defendant, and not the result of the independent 
action of some third party not before the court. 
Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely 
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by 
a favorable decision. 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) 
(internal quotations, alterations, and citations omitted).   
 We have recognized that of the three required elements 
of constitutional standing, ―the injury-in-fact element is often 
determinative.‖  Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 
F.3d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 2009).  To satisfy this requirement, the 
alleged injury must be ―particularized,‖ in that it ―must affect 
the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.‖  Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 560 n.1.  ―[T]he ‗injury in fact‘ test requires more than 
an injury to a cognizable interest.  It requires that the party 
seeking review be himself among the injured.‖  Id. at 563 
(quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 
(1972)).  The injury must also be ―an invasion of a legally 
protected interest.‖  Id. at 560.  Since ―standing is not 
dispensed in gross,‖ Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 n.6 
(1996), a plaintiff who raises multiple causes of action ―must 
demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press.‖  
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006).  
Furthermore, ―the standing inquiry requires careful judicial 
examination of a complaint's allegations to ascertain whether 
the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the 
particular claims asserted.‖  Allen, 468 U.S. at 752. 
 A.  Local 331 
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 The District Court dismissed the TPP Complaint in its 
entirety for lack of standing and failure to state a claim.  
Local 331 contends that the Court applied the wrong standard 
of review and consequently erred in finding that the TPP 
Complaint fails to adequately plead facts to establish an 
injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the Defendants‘ 
alleged misconduct.  Local 331 also argues that the Court 
erred in finding that it failed to state a claim for tortious 
interference with contract and unjust enrichment.  We address 
each of these arguments in turn. 
 Counts I and II of the TPP Complaint assert causes of 
action under the federal and New Jersey RICO statutes, 
respectively.  The federal RICO statute creates a civil remedy, 
including an award of treble damages, costs, and attorneys 
fees, for ―any person injured in his business or property‖ by a 
violation of one of RICO‘s substantive provisions.  18 U.S.C. 
§1964(c).  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), it is unlawful for 
―‗any person‘ who is employed by or associated with ‗any 
enterprise‘ affecting interstate commerce to ‗participate, 
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise‘s 
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.‘‖  Genty v. 
Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 906 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)).  The RICO statute defines 
racketeering activity by a list of crimes, or ―predicate 
offenses,‖ including several state felonies such as murder, 
kidnapping, and bribery that are punishable by imprisonment 
for more than one year, and federal crimes such as bribery, 
mail fraud and wire fraud.  18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). 
 The TPP Complaint also alleges violations of the New 
Jersey RICO statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-4(c), based on 
the same alleged enterprises, predicate offenses, and pattern 
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of racketeering activity as those alleged in support of the 
federal RICO claims. (TPP Compl. ¶¶396-403.)  Since the 
TPP Complaint‘s federal and New Jersey RICO claims 
parallel each other, and because the two RICO statutes are 
intended to be coextensive, we follow the District Court‘s 
approach and analyze the two claims concurrently.  (See A. 
86, n.3); see also Cetel v. Kirwan Fin. Grp., Inc., 460 F.3d 
494, 510 (3d Cir. 2006) (―[T]he New Jersey Supreme Court 
believed the New Jersey RICO statute was and should be 
consistent with the federal RICO statute.‖) (citing State v. 
Ball, 661 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1995)). 
 In addition to meeting the constitutional standing 
requirements, ―plaintiffs seeking recovery under RICO must 
satisfy additional standing criterion set forth in section 
1964(c) of the statute.‖  Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 
482 (3d Cir. 2000).  Section 1964(c) confers standing upon 
―any person injured in his business or property by reason of a 
violation of section 1962 of this chapter . . .‖  18 U.S.C. § 
1964(c).  We have interpreted this language as requiring 
RICO plaintiffs to ―make two related but analytically distinct 
threshold showings‖ to establish standing: ―(1) that the 
plaintiff suffered an injury to business or property; and (2) 
that the plaintiff‘s injury was proximately caused by the 
defendant‘s violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962.‖  Maio, 221 F.3d 
at 483.   
The District Court in this case conducted an extensive 
analysis of the TPP Complaint to determine if it complied 
with the RICO standing requirement of alleging injury to 
business or property.  It concluded that the TPP Complaint 
did not allege a concrete injury to TPP business or property 
because it did not contain sufficient allegations that they paid 
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for prescriptions of the drugs that were actually ineffective or 
otherwise worth less than what they paid for them.  On 
appeal, the parties focused their arguments, in significant part, 
on debating this conclusion.   
Although we agree with the District Court‘s 
conclusion in this respect, we need not reach the question of 
standing under RICO.  It is well-established that a plaintiff‘s 
Article III standing is a prerequisite for the federal courts to 
decide the merits of a suit. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 109-10 (1998). Therefore, 
prior to considering whether Local 331 has standing to bring 
a RICO claim, we must determine whether it has Article III 
standing to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court.  Because we 
find that Local 331 has not established that its alleged injury 
is fairly traceable to Schering‘s alleged wrongful conduct, we 
conclude that the Complaint was properly dismissed for lack 
of Article III standing.  
The District Court held that the TPP Complaint fails to 
sufficiently allege facts to establish that the plaintiffs‘ off-
label purchases of the Subject Drugs—―assuming one were to 
constitute injury-in-fact‖—is fairly traceable to Schering‘s 
allegedly unlawful marketing practices, and ―specifically to 
misrepresentations about the [drugs] and/or to conduct 
characterized as bribery.‖  (A. 95.)  On appeal, Local 331 
argues that if the Court had ―properly applied [the causation] 
standard to the plausibility test, it would have determined that 
there is a traceable connection from Local 331‘s injuries to 
the Defendant‘s illegal marketing scheme.‖  (Local 331 Br. at 
18.) 
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 We limit our analysis to the injury and causation 
theories that Local 331 raises on appeal.
3
  In the Statement of 
Case section of its Brief, Local 331 mentions three distinct 
injuries.  First, it paid for off label prescriptions that were 
ineffective.  Second, it paid for off label prescriptions when 
less expensive but equally effective medication was available.  
And third, it ―paid for elevated drug prices that recouped the 
costs of Schering‘s illegal marketing.‖  (Local 331 Br. At 4.)  
The argument section of its Brief, however, is limited to 
economic loss based on paying for ineffective drugs.  
Accordingly, we further limit our analysis to the question of 
whether the TPP complaint alleges a causal link between the 
challenged conduct and the  injury that Local 331 actually 
argues on appeal. 
 On appeal, Local 331 defends its standing to sue in 
large part on the basis of drug purchases made by the other 
TPP Plaintiffs.  It cites allegations that the Defendants made 
false claims about Temodar and Intron-A, and the other TPP 
Plaintiffs‘ purchases of those drugs for off-label indications.  
(Local 331 Br. at 14-17.)  Such allegations are unhelpful to 
Local 331, which does not allege that it ever paid for a 
Temodar or Intron-A prescription.  See Lewis v. Casey, 518 
U.S. 343, 347 (1996) (requiring named plaintiffs in a putative 
class action to allege ―that they personally have been injured, 
not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified 
members of the class . . . .‖).  Accordingly, we will assess 
whether the TPP Complaint contains sufficient factual 
                                              
3
 We, of course, have no jurisdiction to decide the 
standing of those TPP Plaintiffs who have not appealed.  See 
Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317 (1988); 
Nocula v. UGS Corp., 520 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 2008).   
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allegations to confer standing upon Local 331 based upon its 
alleged purchases.   
 According to the TPP Complaint, Local 331‘s 
damages are limited to two prescriptions of Rebetol:  
Member Kraft and Member Maurone were both 
prescribed Rebetol during the Class Period 
which were paid for in large part by Local 331.  
Upon information and belief, these prescriptions 
were written for off-label uses by physicians 
improperly influenced by the false and 
misleading statements, bribes, and other 
dishonest inducements brought to bear by 
Defendants‘ illegal off-label marketing scheme. 
(TPP Compl. ¶21.)
4
  Accordingly, to establish standing, Local 
331 must allege facts showing a causal relationship between 
the alleged injury—payments for Rebetol that was ineffective 
or unsafe for the use for which it was prescribed—and 
Schering‘s alleged wrongful conduct. 
To show the requisite causal connection, Local 331 
must allege sufficient facts to plausibly support ―a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained 
                                              
4
 Local 331 claims that the TPP Complaint ―alleged 
with requisite specificity that [Local 331] paid for Intron 
Franchise Drugs like Rebetol.‖  (Local 331 Reply at 9) 
(emphasis added).  However, Local 331 does not cite any 
portion of the TPP Complaint that states that Local 331 paid 
for any Intron Franchise Drugs other than two Rebetol 
prescriptions.  (See Local 331 Br. at 15, citing ¶¶ 19, 20, 21, 
117, 127, 128).  
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of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged 
action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent 
action of some third party not before the court.‖  Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 560.  In other words, the Amended Complaint must 
allege facts that plausibly support a causal connection 
between Local 331‘s injury-in-fact and Schering‘s allegedly 
illegal marketing or bribery schemes. 
In arguing that the TPP Complaint meets this burden, 
Local 331 essentially repeats the reasoning that the District 
Court rejected.  Specifically, it states that the TPP Complaint 
alleges both ―an overwhelming and reprehensible pattern of 
deceit by the defendants,‖ including false marketing and 
illegal inducements to doctors, and that this scheme was 
aimed at the TPPs.  (Local 331 Br. at 18-19.)  Local 331 
refers to allegations that Schering ―falsely marketed the 
Intron Franchise Drugs as efficacious‖ for off-label uses, but 
cites only to paragraphs that discuss Intron-A.  (See TPP 
Compl. ¶¶178, 181, 182.)  Likewise, Local 331 argues that 
Schering paid doctors to prescribe the drugs to patients who 
did not need them, but cites only to paragraphs referring to 
Intron-A, Temodar, or Rebetron. (See TPP Compl. ¶¶15-16, 
18, 36, 317-60, 278-89); (Local 331 Br. at 19).  Local 331 
apparently believes that these allegations are an adequate 
basis to conclude that, but-for Schering‘s illegal conduct that 
increased off-sale prescriptions, ―Local 331 either would not 
have had to pay for them, or would not have had to pay for 
them at increased prices over readily-available therapies.‖ (Id. 
at 19.)  
Local 331‘s suggestion that the claims about the other 
drugs are what caused the doctors to prescribe Rebetol for 
off-label uses is inadequate to establish causation.  Local 331 
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claims that the allegations about the other Subject Drugs, 
paired with the fact that ―Schering alone marketed Rebetol,‖ 
together reasonably support the inference that ―discovery will 
almost certainly confirm‖ that Schering also made ―false 
statements about all the drugs described in the Complaint.‖  
(Local 331 Reply at 11.)  Local 331 must allege facts 
sufficient to show that the Rebetol which it paid for was 
prescribed to its members for ineffective off-label uses 
because of Schering‘s alleged misconduct.  There are no 
averments that come close to satisfying this standard.  It is 
pure conjecture to conclude that because Schering‘s 
misconduct caused other doctors to write prescriptions for 
ineffective off-label uses for other products, Local 331 ended 
up paying for two prescriptions for Rebetol due to the same 
kind of misconduct.  Accordingly, Local 331 has failed to 
show the requisite causal relationship between the alleged 
misconduct and its alleged injury.  Therefore, dismissal for 
lack of standing is warranted.
5
  
 B.  Montgomery 
Montgomery, a consumer of Rebetol and PEG-Intron, 
brought the MAC on behalf of a putative nationwide class of 
consumers of the Subject Drugs.  The MAC alleges facts 
                                              
5
 The District Court also held that the failure to allege 
an injury-in-fact traceable to the alleged misconduct 
compelled the conclusion that the TPP Plaintiffs lacked 
standing to assert the common law tort claims of interference 
with contractual relations and unjust enrichment.  We concur.  
Accordingly, there is no need to address the question of 
whether Local 331 alleged viable claims for interference with 
contractual relations or unjust enrichment.   
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particular to her experience and use of two of the Subject 
Drugs, as well as the various legal theories pursued on behalf 
of the consumer plaintiffs. 
Montgomery suffered from Hepatitis C, a viral liver 
infection, and after tests conducted in 1999 showed that she 
was asymptomatic, her physician, Dr. Jeffrey R. Willis, 
decided not to prescribe her a combination therapy of Rebetol 
and Intron-A.  At a follow-up visit in September 2001, Dr. 
Willis recommended a different treatment plan,
6
 even though 
Montgomery was still asymptomatic.  A few months after this 
consultation, Dr. Willis prescribed Montgomery the PEG-
Intron and Rebetol combination therapy, also called the 
―PEG-Intron Combination Therapy.‖  (MAC ¶75.)   
The MAC avers that at the time she was prescribed the 
Subject Drugs, they were only approved for patients with 
                                              
6
 The District Court observed an apparent 
inconsistency in the MAC regarding which drugs Dr. Willis 
decided not to prescribe in 1999—Intron-A and Rebetol, 
according to introductory parts of the MAC—and the drugs 
he decided to prescribe in 2001—Rebetol and PEG-Intron.  
(MAC ¶23.)  The Court drew the ―reasonable inference that 
the treatment discussed in 1999 involved Rebetol and/or 
Intron-A, but not PEG-Intron‖ based on other information in 
the MAC.  It also stated: ―despite the [MAC‘s] assertion that 
the ‗same drugs‘ that Dr. Willis had rejected as unsuited to 
Montgomery‘s condition in 1999 were under consideration in 
2001, the records attached to the [MAC] and specifically 
referenced in paragraph 29 state that Dr. Willis recommended 
in 2001 that Montgomery receive . . . PEG-Intron, not Intron 
A.‖  (A. 109-110.) 
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compensated liver disease, and that since she was healthy and 
did not need treatment, she suffered from the serious side 
effects of the drugs and lost weeks of work due to these side 
effects.  The MAC further claims that Dr. Willis changed his 
mind about her treatment plan because of Schering‘s 
improper marketing of the Rebetol/PEG-Intron combination 
therapy.  Specifically, it alleges: ―Dr. Willis‘ new plan for 
Mrs. Montgomery‘s treatment for her asymptomatic Hepatitis 
C evidences that he was subjected to the marketing and sales 
scheme by Schering alleged in this Amended Complaint.‖ 
(MAC ¶30.) 
The MAC reaches this conclusion based on the alleged 
facts that: (1) due to Schering‘s off-label marketing 
techniques, Dr. Willis mistakenly believed that the 
combination therapy was the standard treatment for 
Montgomery‘s condition; (2) Dr. Willis prescribed the 
combination therapy before sending Montgomery for two 
tests that he suggested were necessary before beginning the 
treatment; (3) Dr. Willis received misinformation from a 
nurse on his staff who was believed to be a Schering-paid 
nurse. 
The MAC contains extensive factual allegations 
regarding the types of improper marketing techniques that 
Schering used, which Montgomery alleges must have 
influenced Dr. Willis between 1999, when he declined to 
prescribe her the drugs, and 2001, when he changed his 
treatment plan.  The MAC reasserts many of the same 
allegations about Schering‘s techniques alleged in the TPP 
Complaint.  The MAC also incorporates by reference all of 
the factual allegations made in a Qui Tam action brought 
against Schering in the District of Massachusetts, and the 
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allegations in the Criminal Information, discussed above, to 
which Schering pleaded guilty.  (MAC ¶¶ 99-101.)  The 
allegations include claims about Schering‘s scheme for 
providing kickbacks to doctors for prescribing the drugs, false 
promotional claims made by sales representatives, and the 
placement of a Schering-paid nurse on Dr. Willis‘ staff.  The 
MAC further alleges that Montgomery ―would not have been 
prescribed and would not have paid for such a costly, 
noxious, and dangerous medication cocktail had she known 
all the facts that were concealed by Defendants and her 
doctors . . . .‖   (MAC ¶¶ 4, 5.)  
The Defendants moved to dismiss the MAC under 
Rule 12(b)(1).  The District Court dismissed the MAC for 
lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), finding that it failed 
to establish a sufficient nexus between her alleged injury and 
Schering‘s alleged misconduct.  
In reaching this conclusion, the Court first found that 
Montgomery had alleged an adequate injury-in-fact for her 
claims under the Washington Consumer Protection Act and 
various common law theories.  The District Court held, 
however, that her ―standing to bring suit founders on her 
inability to establish any nexus between her purported 
injury—be it the needless purchase of the Rebetol/PEG-
Intron, the side-effects she claims to have suffered and/or the 
lost work time—and the wrongful conduct in which Schering 
was allegedly engaged.‖  (A. 117.)  Montgomery‘s theory that 
the Defendants injured her is premised on whether Dr. Willis 
shifted his opinion about the appropriate treatment plan due to 
Schering‘s marketing practices.  The District Court found that 
the MAC ―fails to provide any factual allegations that would 
support [this] conclusion.‖  (A. 118.)   
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On appeal, Montgomery challenges the Court‘s 
dismissal of the MAC on several grounds.  She argues that 
the Court improperly failed to consider certain factual 
allegations, some of which she claims establish the necessary 
causal link.  Moreover, with respect to the factual allegations 
that the Court did consider, Montgomery argues that it 
applied an improper standard in rejecting those allegations as 
inadequate, and claims that when reviewed under the proper 
standard, they do adequately allege a causal nexus.   
Montgomery first challenges the District Court‘s 
decision on the ground that it erred in not fully considering 
―the entirety of the record‖ and taking all factual allegations 
as true.  Montgomery notes that the MAC ―incorporates 
several other documents that set forth in great detail—beyond 
the extraordinary detail contained in the complaint itself—the 
nature and extent of Schering‘s alleged unfair deceptive acts 
and practices.‖ (Montgomery Br. at 25.) These documents 
include: (1) factual averments based on the personal 
knowledge of three former Schering employees in their 
related qui tam case filed in the District of Massachusetts 
(incorporated in the MAC at ¶105); (2) factual allegations 
about the Subject Drugs detailed in the related TPP Amended 
Complaint (incorporated in the MAC at n 1, A. 987); (3) the 
Criminal Information to which Schering pleaded guilty 
(incorporated in the MAC at ¶101); (4) the factual averments 
in the Settlement Agreement in the criminal case 
(incorporated in the MAC at ¶102); and (5) the Corporate 
Integrity Agreement and addendum to the same in the 
criminal case (incorporated in the MAC at ¶103). 
(Montgomery Br. at 25-26.)  Montgomery asserts that ―it is 
not clear from the district court‘s opinion that it took proper 
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account of these documents, and the substantial facts 
contained therein, in its ruling.‖  (Id. at 26.)   
In regard to these documents, the District Court stated: 
Plaintiff apparently believes that somehow, 
through the incorporation of allegations made in 
other proceedings, such as the False Claims Act 
action filed by three qui tam relators, she can 
pursue her own relief against Schering.  The 
irreducible minimum of Article III standing, 
however, requires Montgomery to demonstrate 
that she, personally, has suffered a concrete 
injury, that her injury can be traced to 
Schering‘s misconduct and that it is capable of 
redress by the Court.  
(A. 120.)  This statement suggests that the District Court did 
not permit Montgomery to rely on factual allegations that 
pertain to the standing of other parties in order to establish her 
own standing.  The Court also stated that it did not ignore 
those documents: ―Assuming Schering engaged in all of the 
marketing practices detailed in [the MAC] and in documents 
incorporated by reference, and assuming that the practices 
might be deemed unlawful, none of the factual allegations she 
makes establish the required nexus between her injury and 
Schering‘s actions.‖  (A. 120-21.)  
 It is thus clear that the District Court did not ignore the 
documents that Montgomery sought to incorporate by 
reference in her Amended Complaint.  It is also clear that the 
District Court properly concluded that the averments of 
misconduct did not support a non-conjectural conclusion that 
Dr. Willis had been induced by such misconduct to order the 
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PEG-Intron Combination Therapy.  Moreover, as a general 
matter, even if the Court did decline to consider some of these 
documents, this was not necessarily an error.  Under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint should set forth a ―short and plain 
statement‖ of the claim to relief.  Plaintiffs cannot be 
permitted to incorporate an endless series of external 
documents into a complaint simply ―by reference‖ to them, as 
this would lead to an impossible task for defendants in filing 
their answers, and for courts in reviewing the sufficiency of 
complaints.  In any event, to the extent that Montgomery 
specifically claims that this alleged failure to consider 
particular allegations in the incorporated documents has 
prejudiced her—that is, that such allegations would have 
cured any of the deficiencies in stating causation—we discuss 
those arguments infra. 
To establish standing, the MAC sought to allege a 
causal nexus between Dr. Willis‘ decision to prescribe the 
drugs to Montgomery, and the Defendants‘ alleged fraudulent 
marketing and bribery schemes.  The District Court held that 
the MAC failed to adequately allege any connection between 
Schering‘s alleged bribery scheme and Montgomery‘s 
experience.  The Court explained that the MAC ―lacks any 
allegation either directly accusing or even plausibly 
suggesting that . . . Dr. Willis received [illegal] 
remunerations.‖  (A. 120.)  The Court also rejected the 
MAC‘s allegation about Dr. Willis‘s involvement in a clinical 
trial:  
In the case of Mrs. Montgomery and other 
asymptomatic Hepatitis C patients at [Dr. 
Willis‘ practice], upon information and belief 
based upon the evidence of record, it is alleged 
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that Defendants engaged Dr. Willis in a phony 
clinical trial respecting Rebetron Combination 
Therapy beginning shortly after the August 
2001 FDA approval letter issued. 
(MAC ¶93.) 
The Court found this allegation inadequate because it 
was ―conclusory.‖  (A. 120.)  Even ―assum[ing] the truth of 
fact asserted,‖ and ―credit[ing] the allegation that Dr. Willis 
was involved in a clinical trial,‖ the Court refused to ―credit 
the bald assertion that the trial was ‗phony,‘ presumably 
meaning that Dr. Willis was not actually gathering data and 
studying patients. . . but [was only a] subterfuge for collecting 
payments from Schering for prescribing the drugs being 
studied.‖  (A. 120.)  It rejected this assertion because 
―[n]othing in the [MAC] supports this characterization.‖  (A. 
120.)  
On appeal, Montgomery argues that the Court wrongly 
refused to accept this allegation as true.  In our view, even if 
we found these arguments to be meritorious, they are still 
unavailing.  Even if we accepted the MAC‘s allegation that 
Dr. Willis was involved in a ―phony‖ clinical trial for 
Rebetron Combination Therapy, this fact does not establish 
the necessary causal connection between Schering‘s 
misconduct and Montgomery‘s injury, because she was not 
prescribed the Rebetron Combination Therapy.  To the 
contrary, she was prescribed the PEG-Intron Combination 
Therapy, a combination of Rebetol and another longer-lasting 
form of interferon, PEG-Intron.  (See MAC ¶¶23, 64-66, 74.)   
Thus, as Schering observes: ―Dr. Willis‘s thoughts or 
clinical experiences with that drug therapy are of no moment 
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here.‖  (Schering Br. at 26.)  Notably, Montgomery does not 
apparently challenge this contention in her Reply Brief.  In 
our view, the fact that the allegedly ―phony‖ trial did not even 
concern a treatment regimen that her doctor prescribed to her 
is dispositive.  There is no allegation of fact that supports a 
connection between Schering‘s unlawful conduct of involving 
Dr. Willis in a ―phony‖ trial, and Montgomery‘s prescription 
for a different drug therapy.  
Montgomery‘s other arguments are equally 
unpersuasive.  She contends that the Court ―unfairly 
rebuke[d] [her] for not ‗directly accusing her doctor of a 
crime—i.e., engaging in a phony clinical trial—and 
defrauding his patients and the government.‖  (Montgomery 
Br. at 27.)  She also invokes Rule 11 to argue that her lawyers 
were not permitted to make such an allegation about Dr. 
Willis at this time. (Id. at 28.)  She continues: ―[t]he 
fundamental problem with the district court‘s dismissal is that 
the court required some direct accusation of criminal conduct 
by a non-party at the pleading stage. It was wrong to do so.‖  
(Id.)  
This argument misconstrues the District Court‘s 
analysis, which did not require the MAC to charge Dr. Willis 
with a crime.  Rather, the Court considered the allegation that 
the trial was ―phony‖ to be conclusory because there was 
simply no other allegation in the MAC to support the 
assertion that this particular trial was in fact a disguised 
bribery scheme.  To satisfy the standard, the MAC would not 
have to allege that Dr. Willis had committed a crime, but state 
factual allegations suggesting that the clinical trial was in fact 
somehow fraudulent or undertaken in bad faith. 
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Montgomery argues that the MAC contains allegations 
that support the claim that the trial was ―phony,‖ including an 
allegation citing to a memorandum from one of the qui tam 
relators, a Schering employee who stated that ―his job is 
secure‖ in part because he had ―over 50 [Hepatitis] trials 
underway.‖  (Montgomery Br. at 30, citing MAC ¶ 94-95.)  
This general assertion that 50 Hepatitis clinical trials were 
underway, however, does not support the conclusion that Dr. 
Willis‘s trial was one of those phony trials.  These allegations 
therefore do not ―bolster the main allegation‖ that Dr. Willis 
was involved in a ―phony‖ clinical trial. (Id. at 30.) 
Montgomery points to no other factual allegations in 
the MAC that support the conclusion that Dr. Willis was in 
any way connected with phony trials.  The allegation 
therefore does appear to be a speculative conclusion that falls 
short of stating facts that raise a ―plausible‖ right to relief.  
We conclude that the Court did not err in rejecting the 
assertion, without other supporting factual claims, that Dr. 
Willis was involved in a phony clinical trial.  See Morse v. 
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(holding that a court reviewing a complaint need not credit 
―bald assertions‖ or ―legal conclusions‖). 
The MAC also claimed that three other Schering-
sponsored programs associated with Montgomery‘s treatment 
under Dr. Willis were the causal link between his prescription 
and Schering‘s false marketing campaign.  First, the MAC 
alleges that a Schering-paid nurse in Dr. Willis‘ office, 
identified in the MAC as ―D.S.‖ or ―Diana S.,‖ was part of 
the marketing scheme that affected her treatment.  (MAC ¶ 
42-25.)  The Court held that this allegation that Diana S. ―was 
part of Schering‘s deceitful marketing scheme and somehow 
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caused Dr. Willis to prescribe Rebetol/PEG-Intron to 
Montgomery is purely conclusory.‖  (A. 119.)  The Court 
reasoned that, at most, it could accept as true the alleged 
facts, which stated that this nurse was paid by Schering to 
provide patient support in matters concerning injection-
training and side effects; however, the Court concluded, 
―there is no indication that Schering executed the alleged 
misrepresentations or kickbacks through this PCC.‖  (A. 119.)   
The MAC makes numerous allegations about ―Diana 
S.‖ based on ―information and belief‖;  it never explains, 
however, the basis for its conclusion that she was in fact 
employed by Schering, or that she disseminated any false 
information to Dr. Willis about the Subject Drugs.  In our 
view, the MAC fails to allege sufficient facts to ―show‖ that 
her treatment plan was influenced by Diana S. at the behest of 
Schering.  
The District Court also discredited the MAC‘s 
allegations with respect to two other Schering-sponsored 
programs, the ―Access Assurance Program‖ and ―Be in 
Charge Program.‖  According to the MAC, the ―Access 
Assurance Program‖ supported patients who were undergoing 
treatments by the Subject Drugs by ensuring they had a 
consistent supply of the product, and also allegedly to serve 
as a marketing technique.  (MAC ¶ 48-51.)  Similarly, the 
―Be in Charge‖ program was designed to help support 
patients on Rebetron therapy by providing them with a nurse 
to ensure ―such patients were ‗compliant‘‖ with the therapy 
program, so that Schering could ―ensure that [it] sold as much 
Rebetron Combination Therapy as possible.‖  (MAC ¶ 52.)  
However, the MAC provides no factual allegations describing 
how either of these programs interfered with Dr. Willis‘ 
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decision to prescribe Montgomery the Subject Drugs through 
any false information, or that it gave her any false claims 
about the drugs that otherwise injured her.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that these allegations are not sufficient to form the 
necessary causal nexus. 
Montgomery also raises a handful of other claims that 
are ultimately unavailing.  She argues that the MAC properly 
pleaded causes of action for statutory consumer fraud, 
common law conspiracy, aiding and abetting and unjust 
enrichment.  (Montgomery Br. at 45.)  Montgomery argues 
that the Court should have evaluated her standing to bring the 
claims with regard to each particular claim, and notes that 
other than a brief discussion of the Washington Consumer 
Protection Act, the Court‘s opinion contains ―no discussion of 
the elements of the plaintiff‘s four claims, or the sufficiency 
of her allegations of the same in the MAC.‖  (Id. at 46.)  She 
requests that we vacate the decision and remand it ―for failure 
to adequately address the first step of the requisite two-step 
process under Rule 12.‖ (Id., quoting Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210 
(―First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be 
separated.‖)).  Montgomery then proceeds to exhaustively 
discuss how the MAC pleads all of the requisite elements of 
each of her claims. 
Montgomery‘s focus on the pleading standards for 
each of her claims is secondary to the threshold issue that the 
Court addressed when determining that the MAC did not 
adequately allege an injury fairly traceable to Schering‘s 
alleged misconduct.  Although the MAC is replete with 
factual allegations and indeed asserts them with greater 
specificity than the TPP Complaint, they do not present a 
plausible allegation actually linking Montgomery‘s injuries to 
35 
 
any type of miscommunication or false claim about the drugs 
that were actually prescribed to her.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the Court‘s conclusion that the MAC failed to 
adequately allege causation. 
IV. 
Neither appellant – Local 331 nor Montgomery – has 
alleged facts sufficient to confer standing to seek relief for 
Schering‘s marketing of certain drugs for off-label uses.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‘s rulings. 
